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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past ten years many authors and pundits have publicly discussed the changing 
role of the large, integrated, innovating firm. In the context of increasingly globalized 
markets, ever more complex supply chains and international manufacturing networks, 
corporate decision-making processes involve more and more actors, variables and criteria. 
This is a challenge for corporate head quarters. Many have argued that the role once 
attributed to the integrated innovating organisation and its R&D laboratories is 
increasingly associated with the functioning of networks of specialised innovators.  
 
Building upon previous empirical research, the chief aim of this paper is to argue that the 
role of large firms may have changed, but it is far from disappeared. It does so looking at 
the interplay of increasing knowledge specialization, the development of products of 
increasing complexity that perform a widening range of functionalities, and the emergence 
and diffusion of new design strategies for both products and organisations, namely 
modularity. The emergence of modularity as a product and organizational design strategy 
is clearly connected to recent trends in organisational design. Modularity would allow the 
decoupling of complex artefacts into simpler, self-contained modules. Each module 
would, at the extreme, become the sole business of a specialized trade. This paper builds 
upon the idea that there are cognitive limits to this process of modularisation: what kinds 
of problems firms solve, and how they solve them, set limits to the extent of division of 
labour among firms. We draw implications of such limits for both management and 
economic theory.  
 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes past and on-going changes in 
organizational specialization in the production of artefacts and the production of 
knowledge. Section 3 focuses on the distinction between artefacts and knowledge, and 
shows the cognitive limits to the extent to which knowledge and problem-solving 
activities can be modularised. Section 4 speculates about the implications of our past 
research for organizational sciences and economic theory. Section 5 concludes.   
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2.  EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES & ORGANIZATIONAL 
SPECIALIZATION 
From interchangeable parts to modular networks 
 
The recent growth of product modularity must be seen as part of the continuing interaction 
between changes in technology and in organizational specialization over the past 200 
years.  These are discussed in detail below and are summarized in Table 1, which shows 
that: 
•  certain major advances in technology have been key factors in changes in  
organizational specialization, sometimes leading to disintegration, and sometimes to 
integration; 
•  the degree of disintegration in the production of artefacts has always been greater than 
in the production of technological knowledge. 
 
{Table 1 about here} 
 
Adam Smith’s pin factory is mainly a story about innovation in production processes.  The 
conditions for the mechanization of repetitive manual operations emerged from the 
specialization of tasks within the factory.  As anticipated by Smith, the design and 
building of these machines would become ‘… the business of a peculiar trade …’.  This 
happened with the spread and the growing standardization of specific mechanical 
operations (e.g. spinning and weaving in textiles), which went hand in hand with the 
growth of a large demand for standardized goods. More generally, the provision of 
product components and parts becomes specialized businesses as they became 
standardized and inter-changeable.  And the provision of mechanical inventions itself 
became a specialized trade, with the development of specialised intermediaries, namely, 
patent agents (Lamoureaux and Sokoloff, 1999) and consultant engineers (Saul, 1967; 
1970).  So, in those sectors where a large demand for homogeneous consumer goods 
developed, there also developed a division of labour between independent manufacturers, 
machine builders and mechanical inventors.  This inter-firm specialization would not have   3 
been possible without continuing and largely craft-based improvements in the quality of 
the metals, and the accuracy with which they could be cut or shaped (Bernal, 1953). 
 
However, a number of complementary radical innovations from the middle of the 19
th 
century generated two trends that pushed toward increasing integration of innovative 
activities. Both have been documented by Chandler (1977; 1990), Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1991) and other scholars.  The first is the emergence of mass production, in order to 
exploit the economies of scale and speed in production, and the reduced transport costs, 
both made possible by the availability of the new power sources (e.g. coal, and then 
electricity and oil) and better materials (e.g. high quality iron, then steel).  Increasing size 
led to increasing functional specialization with the firm, and the need for co-ordinated 
planning between material purchase, production and marketing.   
 
Second, advances in specialized mechanical, chemical and electrical knowledge opened up 
major new opportunities for product innovation, not only in machinery and parts, but also 
in consumer goods, transportation, materials and communications.  The development of 
these new products required the integration of partly tacit knowledge across disciplines 
(e.g. purely mechanical products became electro-mechanical), and between the R&D and 
other functions within the firm, particularly manufacturing and marketing. Under these 
circumstances, integration has been more efficient than markets (Mowery, 1983).  This 




However, in the last 20 years, new forces have surfaced that begin to modify this pattern. 
Products are becoming increasingly complex, embodying both an increasing number of 
subsystems and components, and a widening range of fields of specialized knowledge.  
This increasing product (or system) complexity is itself one consequence of increased 
specialization in knowledge production, which has resulted in both better understanding of 
cause-effect relations, and better and cheaper methods of experimentation.  This in turn 
has reduced the costs of technological search, and thereby enabled greater complexity in 
terms of the number of components, parts or molecules that can be successfully embodied 
in a new product or service.  
   4 
Increasing knowledge specialization and complexity challenges traditional ways of co-
ordinating firms’ activities. Specialization in knowledge production has increased the 
range of fields of knowledge that contribute to the design of each product. Compare what 
originally was the largely mechanical loom, with the many fields of specialized 
knowledge – electrical, aerodynamic, software, materials – that are now embodied in the 
contemporary design; or observe the contemporary automobile that must increasingly 
integrate plastic and other new materials, as well as electronic and software control 
systems.  
 
The growing number of specialized fields that are embodied in increasingly complex 
products also leads to an increasing number of specialized professions and communities 
whose activities need to be monitored and co-ordinated to be competitive. Relatedly, firms 
designing these increasingly complex products have found it more difficult to master 
advances in all the fields embodied in them.  Hence the growing importance of modular 
designs, where component interfaces are standardized, and interdependencies amongst 
components are decoupled.  This, in principle, enables the outsourcing of design and 
production of components and subsystems, within the constraints of overall product (or 
system) architecture. 
 
Opportunities have also emerged for further vertical disintegration between product design 
and manufacture, based on further technological convergence (i.e. in convergence, based 
on technical change, in specific production operations across firms, products or 
industries). Rosenberg (1963) has shown how specialized machine tool firms emerged in 
the 19
th century, because advances in metal cutting and metal forming techniques led to 
technological convergence in operations that were common to a number of manufacturing 
processes (e.g. boring accurate circular holes in metal was common to the making of both 
small arms and sewing machines).  The size of the market for such common operations 
therefore often became large enough to sustain the growth of small specialized firms 
designing and making the machines to perform them.  Large manufacturing customers 
could therefore buy machines incorporating the latest improvements fed back from many 
users, and therefore superior to what they could do by themselves.  In contemporary terms, 
designing and making such machines no longer gave large manufacturing firms a 
distinctive competitive advantage.  Subsequently, similar mechanisms have been at work   5 
in such fields as control and measuring instruments, chemical process engineering, robots 
and applications software. 
 
A third factor now modifying patterns of specialization is the impact of advances in ICT, 
reflected in reductions in the cost and increase in capacity of several orders of magnitude 
for storing, manipulating and transmitting information.  These changes open options for 
more complex systems (through digitization), reduce the costs of experimentation 
(through simulation techniques) and allow greater disintegration (through lower costs of 
transmitting information) (Pavitt and Steinmueller, 2001; D’Adderio, 2001). 
 
At first sight, these changes appear to point to a neatly specialized system for the 
production of innovations, with product and systems designers, their sub-contractors for 
components and subsystems, and their manufacturers, working together through arm’s-
length market relations. For example, Sturgeon (2002) has analyzed the rise of contract 
manufacturing in electronics: namely, firms that take over electronic product designs from 
other firms, and do the detailed engineering and manufacture.  The technological 
convergence is based on increasing automation of routine operations (e.g. component 
insertion), and on the increasing use of standard software tools.  He reports that contract 
manufacturing is also growing in other industries
1, and stresses the importance of the 
development of ‘… the modular production network, because distinct breaks in the value 
chain tend to form at points where information regarding product specifications can be 
highly formal....within functionally specialized value chain nodes activities tend to be 
highly integrated and based on tacit linkages.  Between these nodes, however, linkages are 
achieved by the transfer of codified information.’ 
 
Sturgeon’s ‘modular’ network is thus characterized by a specific pattern of division of 
labour, and implicitly assumes a similar pattern of division of knowledge. Each node (a 
firm) in the network should specialize on a specific, mono-functional, module. Each firm 
should carry out R&D on that module. An assembly company would be present, selecting 
modules on a competitive basis, and assembling them following the interfaces of the  
                                                 
1 He lists apparel and footwear, toys, data processing, offshore oil drilling, home furnishings and lighting, 
semiconductor fabrication, food processing, automotive parts, brewing, enterprise networking and 
pharmaceuticals.  In addition, Prencipe (1997) has shown increases in the outsourcing of production of 
aircraft engine components.   6 
existing product architecture. The assembling company would maintain capabilities over 
the interfaces, and the assembling activities, but would consider each module as a ‘black 
box’. Architectural and component-level knowledge and capabilities should be separated, 
the former being developed by the assembling company, the latter by the component 
suppliers. The very process of innovation could be modularised: each firm, focusing on a 
specific module, would be able to focus its learning and innovative efforts (Arora, 
Gambardella and Rullani, 1998). As pointed out by Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and 
Radner (1992), since components’ interfaces are not permitted to change within an 
intended period of time, a modular architecture would create an ‘information structure’ 
that smoothly co-ordinates decentralized design teams.  In this way, the ‘information 
structure’ would also act as a ‘compensation mechanism’ that holds the systems together 
without the need to exert explicit managerial authority. 
 
3.  THE DIVISION OF LABOUR AND THE DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
We have argued in the past that it is highly dangerous to neglect the importance of the 
distinction between the properties of artefacts, the knowledge on which they are based, 
and the degree to which such knowledge can be transformed into information (Brusoni, 
Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001).  It is one thing to co-ordinate the development and production 
of artefacts; and another thing altogether to co-ordinate the evolution of the underlying 
knowledge bases. Briefly stated, in a number of sectors, technologies and products have 
been shown to follow interconnected, yet different, dynamics (Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2001). Detailed sectoral studies confirm that (some) firms within networks of vertically 
related companies maintain S&T capabilities over a set of fields wider than that justified 
by their in-house activities. Thus, Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt (1997) found that large 
firms are more diversified in the technologies that they master than the products that    7 
they make and that their technological diversity has been increasing while they have 
typically been narrowing their product range. Similar results emerged from studies of 
highly innovative sectors, such as aero-engines (Prencipe, 1997), pharmaceuticals 
(Orsenigo, Pammolli and Riccaboni, 2001), telecommunications infrastructure (Davies, 
1997), and hard disk drive (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2000). Similar evidence is 
emerging from detailed studies of traditional sectors such as chemical engineering 
(Brusoni, 2001), tyres (Acha and Brusoni, 2002), oil exploration (Acha, 2002) and the 
automotive industry (Takeishi, 2002).     
 
The gap between firms’ production and knowledge boundaries is the outcome of their 
efforts to reconcile apparently conflicting objectives. On the one hand, firms aim to 
exploit flexibility and to cut costs by outsourcing the production and detailed design of 
modular components and subsystems, i.e., they should buy. On the other, firms’ 
competitive positions may depend on the capability to introduce radical product and 
component innovations by building on in-house technological capabilities, i.e., they 
should make. Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001) developed a simple framework that 
explains how firms reconcile this strategic dilemma, using networks of specialized 
suppliers of components and knowledge. In particular, they showed that the interaction of 
component- and technological-level interdependencies leads to the emergence of 
alternative organizational forms, which they named as decoupled (or modular) networks, 
tightly coupled networks (at the extreme, a vertically integrated firm), or loosely coupled 
networks.   
 
{Figure 1 about here} 
 
Each organizational form relies on a different mode of co-ordination. Modular networks 
would rely on market incentives, and the information structure defined by the modular 
product architecture. Tightly coupled networks would rely on the traditional advantages of 
hierarchies and ownership. A key characteristic of loosely coupled network organizations 
is the presence of a systems integrator firm that outsources detailed design and 
manufacturing to specialised suppliers while maintaining in-house concept design and 
systems integration capabilities to co-ordinate the work (R&D, design, and 
manufacturing) of suppliers. These networks may produce modular products, but are not 
themselves modular, as they are led by firms that maintain an ‘integrated’ knowledge   8 
base, even in the presence of a great deal of specialization at the functional level (e.g. 
manufacturing, distribution, etc.).   
 
The functioning of markets and hierarchies as co-ordination devices has received quite a 
lot of attention. In the context of increasing knowledge specialization, and product 
complexity, new ways of co-ordinating activities are emerging, as well as new 
organizational forms: the notion of ‘hybrid’ organization (often evoked) hides more than it 
reveals. Our earlier research on organizational ‘coupling’ meant to provide more useful 
categories to study hybrid, yet long-lasting, ways of organizing the production of 
knowledge and artefacts. We proposed the concept of coupling for identifying them and 
that of systems integration to address the issue of how they are co-ordinated. The 
following section briefly summarise a specific case of a modular product (a chemical 
plant) developed by an organisation that is not itself modular. We use such case discussed 
at length elsewhere to ground our conclusive ‘speculations’.  
 
3.1. Toward modular networks? Some empirical observations.
2 
 
The organization of chemical engineering activities is often used as an example of highly 
modularized activity (Landau and Rosenberg, 1992; Rosenberg, 1998; Arora, Gambardella 
and Rullani, 1998). First, the artefact (i.e. the chemical plant) is made up of a huge number 
of ‘modules’ whose interconnections seem to be well understood. Indeed, different 
modules are likely to be produced by specialized suppliers, which produce according to 
specifications. No component is actually produced by the final users, or leading 
engineering designers. Second, the very discipline of chemical engineering developed out 
of the principle that all chemical processes can be designed by mixing and matching a 
finite number of unit operations and unit processes (Rosenberg, 1998). Third, the maturity 
of the technology (and other factors) has led most chemical firms to outsource their 
engineering services, particularly at the detailed engineering level. It seems that these 
dynamics well describe what Sturgeon (2002) called a ‘modular network’.  
 
Brusoni (2001, 2003) analyzed in detailed the project management strategies of chemical 
firms following the great outsourcing and downsizing wave which started in the mid 
                                                 
2 This section builds upon Brusoni (2003), sections 3 and 4.   9 
1980s. First, it is true that the maturity of the technology has led to a tight division of 
labour between chemical firms and Specialized Engineering Firms (SEFs) on the one side, 
and component suppliers on the other. A chemical plant is, overall, a modular product. But 
this is as far as the modularity argument goes. Indeed, while it is true that the discipline of 
chemical engineering was founded on the notion of mixing and matching unit operations, 
it is also true that increasing understanding of the dynamics and kinetics of the chemistry 
used led to the adoption of more general representations of how chemical processes 
‘happen’. In the 1960s, the ‘transport phenomena’ revolution (Furter, 1980) changed the 
way chemical engineers conceptualize chemical processes. Nowadays, all chemical 
processes are represented in terms of mass and energy balance equations that ‘cut across’ 
specific process steps, and unit operations. More interestingly, even at the engineering 
level, where plant modularity is a very common construction strategy, engineers 
commonly use search heuristics alternatives to increasing modularity. For example, 
‘telescoping’ - i.e. the integration of different functions within a single module - is also 
quite common, and maybe leading to major changes in the way this industry works.  
 
It is worth noting that chemical firms maintain capabilities on complex and critical process 
steps, such as reaction modelling, catalysis and catalysts, and separation processes. They 
do so in order to be able to act as problem solvers of last resort, a sort of central bank of 
capabilities. Chemical firms that have outsourced and downsized without maintaining in-
house capabilities on critical process steps have become very ‘poor clients’ for SEFs, as 
they cannot specify what they need, nor can they intervene when problems occur. The 
most effective project management strategies are characterized by the integration of the 
design teams of both chemical firms and SEFs, rather than by the modular ‘handing over’ 
of a complete design package to a competitively selected supplier of engineering services 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) argued that projects where contractors have full 
responsibility from the very early stages of project definition (with almost no input from 
the owner) are those exhibiting the worst overall performance.  Figure 2 reports some 
performance indicators relative to cost growth (over the expected values), relative 
engineering and construction time (as a measure of the re-working necessary to bring the 
plant to operability) and start-up time (how many calendar months it takes to bring the 
plant to full-scale operability). Furthermore, even the ‘all operators’ projects do not show   10 
outstanding results: they face increasing difficulties in defining the overall goals and 
technology requirements of their projects, because of the loss of experienced personnel.  
The best performers are the ‘integrated’ projects, where contractors are brought on board 
early and the lead is taken by whoever retains capabilities particularly relevant to the 
project.  As discussed in Brusoni and Prencipe (2001), rather than tight division of labour, 
good project performance requires increasing integration (within projects) between 
operators and contractors.  What was disintegrated on one side (in terms of in-house detail 
design capabilities) has to be re-integrated by an open and integrated management of 
projects.  Operators have tried to compensate decreasing in-house capabilities (of a 
specific kind) by ‘pulling up’ contractors into a different type of design activities: more 
upfront design activities are now expected from SEFs, traditionally more involved in 
detailed engineering, construction and project management activities. 
 
{Figure 2 about here} 
 
But why this increasing ‘integration’ at the project level? Brusoni (2003) argued that the 
division (and modularization) of engineering labour is limited by the nature of engineering 
design as a problem-solving activity, rather than by the extent of the market per se. He 
decomposed engineering design activities into two ‘modes’ of problem-solving (analysis 
and synthesis), and then discussed their organizational implications. The aim of designers 
in ‘synthesis mode’ is to generate ‘a system from its constituents’ given different possible 
inputs and expected outputs. This is the stage when engineers aim at generating variations 
(figure 3). Engineers in ‘synthesis mode’ generate process alternatives (i.e. decomposition 
patterns) that are then evaluated in terms of the sub-problem trees of which they are 
constituted. This is why chemical firms that have reduced their direct involvement in 
overall engineering design activities, still maintain capabilities focused on the key 
components and process steps.  
 
The aims of designers in ‘analysis mode’ are different. They need to check that all sub-
problems within a given system can actually be solved in a consistent manner and all 
process stages deliver what they are expected to. This is the stage when engineers 
approach sub-problems in order to retain selectively those variations that generate solvable 
sub-problem trees (see figure 3). Engineers in ‘analysis mode’ explore specific sub-  11 
problems along a pre-defined (at synthesis level) set of interdependencies that impose 
limits on the degrees of freedom they can exploit.  
 
{Figure 3 about here} 
 
Although distinct, these two problem-solving modes cannot be perfectly separated in 
cognitive terms. Technological- and component-level factors determine the extent to 
which engineering labour can actually be divided. This is why chemical firms that have 
reduced their direct involvement in engineering design activities, need to set highly 
integrated and collaborative project environments: they need to access early on the 
detailed engineering capabilities maintained by the SEFs. Engineering design problem-
solving is based upon the recursive exploration of hierarchically decomposed problems. 
Critical and technically difficult process steps require extensive detailed calculations and 
testing prior to the decision to freeze a design package. Also, uneven rates of change of the 
technologies (i.e. bodies of knowledge and practice) that engineers rely on determine 
salients that induce firms to integrate and develop in-house competencies to explore new 
search paths. These explorative activities entail a sequence of synthesis/analysis problem-
solving that limits the extent of division of engineering labour. 
 
This recursive process of analysis and synthesis limits the extent to which engineering 
labour can be modularised, and co-ordinated through the exchange of codified 
information. For example, co-locating design teams from different firms involved in the 
same project is a very common strategy. Organizational strategies have to consider the 
interaction between different types of engineering design and different modes of 
engineering problem-solving. Such an interaction sets limits to the emergence of truly 
modular networks, co-ordinated through markets and the exchange of codified 
information. Firms and corporate HQs are not replaced by markets, but by the temporary 
hierarchy defined within a specific project.  Hence, the emergence of less-than-modular 
networks.  
 
The wide capabilities that integrators maintain in-house allow them to solve problems in a 
co-ordinated manner, i.e. co-ordinating specialized suppliers of components and 
knowledge through ‘authoritative’ interventions. As stressed by Simon (1982) and more 
recently by Loasby (1999: 100), authority is not necessarily associated with formal   12 
hierarchies but rather with the willingness of the recipient to consider a specific 
‘communication’ as ‘authoritative’. In turn, this willingness derives from the acceptance 
of ‘zones of indifference’ whereby recipients reckon they have to rely on the capabilities 
of somebody else, somebody to whom they grant ‘authority’. Chemical firms can work as 
‘problem-solvers of last resort’ as long as they know much more than any one other 
organization involved in the design and engineering of a plant. SEFs appear therefore to 
be willing to accept operators’ ‘authority’ whenever their capabilities do not allow them to 
solve a specific problem.
3 However, within a chemical engineering network, the 
complexity of the activities is such that authority flows up and down the hierarchy 
seamlessly, because no-one or no single organization can encompass all the bits of 
relevant knowledge needed (hence the success of the ‘integrated’ projects in figure 2). It is 
well known that different SEFs do maintain specialized capabilities on specific process 
steps, or types of catalysts. For example, historically M.W. Kellogg has maintained and 
developed capabilities focused on ethylene processes and high-pressure ammonia 
synthesis.   
 
4.   CO-ORDINATION IN THE MODULAR AGE: SOME IMPLICATIONS 
 
This section highlights possible future developments of this line of research. We speculate 
along two lines.  First, we have argued that the authority of systems integrators depends on 
their abilities to ‘frame’ problems, to simplify them identifying things that ‘do not deserve 
to be pursued any further’. This type of problem-solving (i.e. synthesis) is not perfectly 
separable from the ‘analysis’ of specific sub-problems: alternative decomposition patterns 
can be assessed only in terms of the sub-problems they generate, and their solvability. 
Hence, the finding that system integrators maintain capabilities at both the architectural 
level and the component level (see also Prencipe, 1997; Davies, 1997). Section 4.1 builds 
upon this result to argue how it is ‘organizationally possible’ for some firms to extend 
their span of ‘authoritative communications’ beyond their boundaries, as defined by the 
ownership of assets. In so doing, we discuss the increasingly studied notion of the project-
based firm (PBF).  
 
                                                 
3 Contractual considerations also play a role. There are problems SEFs cannot solve without involving their 
clients because they need approval for decisions that may radically change the budget and/or the timetable.   13 
Second, we have argued that chemical firms that have outsourced their detailed 
engineering capabilities still need them when they are solving problems in synthesis mode. 
Hence, the finding that SEFs are being involved more and more often in conceptual design 
activities, and the better performance of ‘integrated’ projects relatively to more arm’s- 
length solutions, based on the transfer of a codified design package. Section 4.2 will focus 
on what this line of enquiry might contribute to economics research on firms’ boundaries. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the incomplete contracts theory, and the problem of 
allocation of residual rights in the presence of unforeseen contingencies.  
 
4.1. The span of authority: the project-based organisation. 
 
The imperfections of the market system in the presence of uncertainty are well known, at 
least since the seminal works of March and Simon (1958) and Arrow (1974). However, 
counter arguments are not in short supply. See for example the literature on modularity 
that stresses how modular architectures define an information structure that holds together 
decentralised networks with no need for explicit authority (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; 
Arora. Gambardella and Rullani, 1998, Sturgeon, 2002). Our own fieldwork showed that 
external inputs are very useful when ‘integrators’ are still in synthesis mode. For example, 
consultants exist that provide not only tools and techniques to improve a firm’s decision-
making process, but also decisions. See, for example, the emergence of a specialised niche 
sector of engineering consultants that advice chemical firms on whether or not to sanction 
major capital projects, or how to change the proposed design package. 
 
While we have argued that the case for ‘modular networks’ co-ordinated by markets 
through the exchange of codified information is overstated, we also believe that the case 
for hierarchies needs to be reconsidered in the light of new empirical evidence that 
highlights the emergence of new organizational forms. Thus, we discuss the role that 
‘projects’ and project-based organizations play in enhancing our understanding of the role 
of firms in the modern economy. 
 
Let us start by noting that the co-ordination of specialized knowledge ultimately resolves 
into the co-ordination of specialized communities. Communities are defined around 
                                                                                                                                                   
However, the engineers interviewed in the fieldwork stressed the high-level ‘problem-solving’ role played   14 
specific tasks, activities, or practices (Brown and Duguid, 2001) or specific problems, or 
proble-solving methods (Steinmueller, 2000). The former are called ‘communities of 
practice’; the latter ‘epistemic communities.’ Members develop a sense of ‘belonging’ to 
their community, to the extent that individuals’ loyalty toward the community may be 
stronger than that to the ‘organization’. Kogut and Zander (1996) argued that firms exist in 
order to provide one common ‘identity’ to their members, and that firms are much better 
than markets in providing resolution to conflicting loyalties. If by ‘identity’ we mean a 
‘common closure’ to specialized learning processes, little room for disagreement is left. 
However, the key point overlooked by Kogut and Zander is that such organizational 
‘identity’ need not be defined once and for all. In an innovative environment, this would 
hamper the capabilities to perceive and exploit new opportunities. In organizational terms, 
the case for ‘hierarchy’ is overstated. The approach we adopt here stresses that it is not a 
matter of identity, but of diverse identities that need to be – temporarily-reconciled.  
 
This point is of fundamental importance in an innovative context. The interaction of 
heterogeneous communities is a vital source of variety, of new ideas, of new problems and 
new solutions. At the same time though, occupational groups can also resist change due to 
their epistemic and cognitive differences (von Meier, 1999).
 4 Brown and Duguid (2001), 
like Langlois and Cosgel (1993) and Kogut and Zander (1996), conclude their analysis 
arguing that this type of ‘interpretative’ co-ordination is ‘often better achieved within the 
structure of the firm than in the marketplace’ (p. 209).  But they really do not explain why. 
We think that by considering more closely how firms organize their actual engineering 
development activities, we can answer this question.  
 
The key point to stress here is that firms in a variety of sectors operate on a project basis. 
A project is ‘a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product or service’ 
(PMI 1996). A project is basically a contract, or rather a bundle of contracts, that specify 
duties, responsibilities and rewards of the firms involved in, for example, designing and 
building a chemical plant. To continue with our chemical engineering example, a project 
is defined around a design package (i.e. the output of engineers in ‘synthesis mode’). The 
design package would define the key parameters of the plant to be built (e.g. capacity, 
main products and by-products, location, etc.). This design package provides a ‘common 
                                                                                                                                                   
by the operators’ engineering units.    15 
closure’ to all the communities involved in the project, identifies the key technological and 
organizational interdependencies, set a timetable, allocate responsibilities. It is the result 
of the ‘negotiation’ undertaken between the various communities that coexist within a firm 
at all times. At the same time, the project is a ‘temporary’ endeavour. While providing, in 
a sense, a common identity to all the communities involved in the project, such an identity 
is going to disappear once the project is over.  
 
We think it is no accident that the literature on project-based organizations (Gann and 
Salter, 1998) is developing as fast as that on communities and specialized knowledge. It is 
unfortunate that, so far, they have remained separated. The literature on project-based 
firms (PBFs) identifies these firms as characterized by the prevalence of project activities 
(as opposed to, for example, functions); their involvement in the design and production of 
customized products and services; and their involvement in wide coalitions of companies 
along the value chain (Gann and Salter, 1998: 450). Figure 4 describes how projects 
operate as ‘gates’ between the firm and the external environment. At the same time, this 
figure does capture the pivotal role played by in-house R&D and technical support units, 
and senior management.  
 
{Figure 4 about here} 
 
The concept of PBF is similar to that of ‘adhocracy’ proposed by Mintzberg (1989). 
However, the PBFs literature highlights that projects are becoming an increasingly 
diffused organizational strategy in a wide, and widening, range of sectors, spanning from 
traditional manufacturing to innovative, knowledge-intensive service industries. Projects 
seem to us a rather effective tool through which firms can reconcile the identities of the 
communities that interact within, and across, them. In a fast-changing environment, it is 
important that the diversity of identities is maintained; hence the importance of the 
‘temporary’ dimension of project-based activities. In a competitive environment, it is also 
important to be able to bring specialized and dispersed learning processes to a ‘common 
closure’, and implement the selected solution; hence, the importance of projects as 
contracts that set duties, responsibilities and rewards on the basis of, for example, a design 
package. This idea of a ‘temporary’ identity clearly builds upon the notion of routines as 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 We are grateful to Eugenia Cacciatori for making us note this point, and the work of von Meier.   16 
‘truces’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and that of ‘quasi resolution of conflict’ (Cyert and 
March, 1963).  
 
Projects appear to us as bundles of incomplete contracts with which firms prepare to 
unforeseen contingencies and opportunities. Projects enable firms to tie in ‘networks of 
practice’ (Brown and Duguid, 2001). Within projects, loosely related communities 
interact, achieving a temporary common identity. Once the project is terminated, the loose 
network of practice that had developed is disbanded. The management literature is quite 
rich in examples that stress how difficult it is to transfer lessons from project to project 
(e.g. Prencipe and Tell, 2001). The disappearance of the network of practice formed 
within the project might well explain why it is so difficult for project-based knowledge to 
leak into the next project. The context within which communication was possible is just 
not there anymore. Also, this line of reasoning extends the point we made in previous 
research on loosely coupled networks, co-ordinated by firms that ‘know more than they 
make’. They do so because systems-integrating firms need to be plugged into a variety of 
communities of practice. They need to be linked to these communities to receive useful 
inputs at conceptual design stage, and to be able to select partners once the design package 
is frozen and the project set up around it.  
 
4.2. Implications for economic theory 
 
As argued by Langlois (2002), in the property rights tradition, the theory of the firm is 
largely ‘a theory of the coalescence of property rights’ (p. 29). This approach focuses on 
‘the incentives aspects of property’. One strand of this approach sees ownership as ‘the 
equivalent to a claim on residual income’ (ibid.). This is the approach of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), who focuses on the externalities problem generated by team production 
that leads to ‘the coalescence of property into one set of hands’ (ibid.). A second strand, 
initiated by the work of Hart (1989) sees ownership ‘as involving residual rights of 
control’, rather than residual income (ibid.). Either way, efficiency considerations would 
drive the process of reallocation of property rights.  
 
However, uncertainty and specialized knowledge also play a role in determining the 
modularisation or coalescence of property rights. Langlois (2002), Loasby (1976; 1999) 
and Foss and Foss (2002) approach the incomplete contracts literature turning upside   17 
down the thrust of the discussion. They argue that the incompleteness of contracts is not of 
interest only (nor mainly) because, for instance, it causes ‘hold up’ problems, but also (and 
mainly) because of the learning opportunities these contracts open up to firms that face a 
truly uncertain environment. As Loasby (1999) put it, the open-endedness of contracts 
leaves room for future contracts to accommodate unforeseen (and unforeseeable) 
circumstances. The fact that contracts are incomplete is not a problem. It is an 
opportunity.
5 This point brings to mind mainstream work on property rights (e.g. Klein, 
1992). As recognized by, for instance, Holmström and Roberts (1998), economic theory 
identifies the boundaries of the firm ‘with the ownership of assets, but in the real world, 
control over assets is a more subtle matter’ (p. 84). Within a property rights framework, 
they point out that ‘contractual assets’ can be created to serve the same purposes that 
theory assigns to ownership. They call these contractual assets ‘governance contracts’, and 
they are ‘powerful vehicles for regulating markets’ (p. 85). The chief effect of this specific 
type of contract is to ‘place firms at the center of a network of relationship, rather than as 
owners of a clearly defined set of capital assets’ (ibid.).  
 
Their position is quite interesting in a number of ways. First of all, it is just reassuring to 
see that the issues proposed by Richardson in his seminal work are still pertinent to 
economic analysis (‘Firms are not islands but are linked together in patterns of co-
operation and affiliation’, 1972: 895; but see also his earlier 1960 book).  Second, in a 
rather abstract manner they raise problems that the more empirically-oriented literature on 
which this paper largely relies has also addressed, and partially solved. Two issues are 
worth mentioning here. First of all, firms within this ‘network of relationships’ 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998: 85) are not all alike. Some firms will be more central than 
others, and play different roles within these networks. This observation is quite pertinent 
to our discussion of, for example, systems-integrating firms. Why some firms become 
central nodes, and how, while others do not, is an interesting question. We think that some 
research on modularity can help explain this problem. The concept of authority as  
developed above, and its linkages to the notion of ‘judgement’ and ‘capabilities’ all help 
in addressing these questions.  
 
                                                 
5 Within more mainstream terrain, Becker and Murphy (1992) develop a formal model that is quite close to 
this discussion using the notion of ‘specialized knowledge’ and modelling the vertical relationship between   18 
Secondly, networks differ in a number of ways, and the examples that Holmström and 
Robert put forward are actually examples of extremely heterogeneous network structures 
(e.g. biotechnology, software, steel). Research on modularity has put forward a variety of 
organizational forms that are associated with the diffusion of modular products (Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001; Helfat 
and Eisenhardt, 2002; Sturgeon, 2002). For example, a more precise analysis of the 
technological and component-level interdependencies that firms need to address when 
designing products and processes might explain the emergence of alternative network 
forms.   
 
Moreover, like all contracts, even the governance contracts that Holmström and Roberts 
(1998) discuss, are likely to be incomplete. This creates all the problems (and 
opportunities) that the literature on property rights and incomplete contracts focuses on. It 
is interesting to analyze what the criteria are that lead to the allocation of residual rights in 
an incomplete governance contracts setting. Again, we think that this sort of question can 
be answered by looking at recent studies that focus on innovation, modularity and the 
boundaries of the firm. For example, in our fieldwork, and related industry studies, 
systems integrators appear as the holders of the residual right to solve unforseen problems 
that emerge as the design problem unfolds. What enables them to do so is the wide (and 
widening) range of scientific and technological capabilities they maintain in-house. More 
generally, we contend that the distinction between knowledge and artefacts, and the 
related distinction between the knowledge and production boundaries of the firm can help 
make sense of the subtleties and fuzziness of the organizations we observe in the real 
world. In particular, a number of useful lessons can be learnt when analyzing how firms 
design projects, how they select partners, and what specific contractual mechanisms are 
put in place. We do not know enough, for example, about how different methods of 
‘pricing’ engineering and construction services impact the project performance.  
 
Relatedly, it is worth noting one fundamental point that the economic theory should 
contribute to our understanding of modularity. The organizational and management 
literature we have relied on analyses firms and communities as ‘learning environments’. 
Firms and organizations are not just problem-solving devices. They also embody incentive 
                                                                                                                                                   
different types of agents. Jensen and Meckling (1992) also touch upon these issues in an incomplete   19 
and monitoring structures. We do not know much about this. The key working assumption 
we have maintained is that the main problem is understanding how firms develop and 
access the capabilities necessary to conceive, design, build and market a new product. If 
the capabilities are in place, co-ordination is about solving problems of ‘cognitive 
dissonance’. But opportunism does not play a big role in this picture. This is at odds with 
much work of firms and organizations, and needs to be taken into account.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND SPECULATIONS 
 
This paper started trying to put modularity in its historical context. We have argued that 
modularity and organizational disintegration are the latest cognitive and organizational 
responses to increasing systemic and cognitive specialization and complexity. As in earlier 
responses, disintegration is stronger in the production of artefacts than in the production of 
knowledge. Co-ordination and systems integration are necessary to establish product-
system architecture, and to integrate both complex systems and fast-changing and partly 
tacit knowledge. As a consequence, we have discussed the notion of authority that is based 
upon the capabilities of systems integrating firms to solve complex problems, organize 
labour around the proposed solutions, and modify such an organization, should the need 
emerge.  
 
On a theoretical note, the distinction between knowledge and product-level dynamics has 
important implications for management and economics. Regarding the former, we have 
argued in the past that modularity at the artefact level does not necessarily lead to 
modularity at the level of the organization, or its underlying knowledge bases. We have 
argued here that the emergence of modular networks is limited by the very nature of the 
social cognitive processes that underpin firms’ activities (e.g. the links between analysis 
and synthesis). Recent research on the dynamics of communities of practice and project-
based organizations seems to us to open promising avenues to analyze and understand the 
relationship between cognitive processes and new organizational forms without ‘black-
boxing’ them into the hollow concept of ‘hybrid organizational forms’.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
contracts framework, when they talk about ‘specific and general knowledge’.   20 
Regarding economics, we think research on modularity might have useful implications for 
economists interested in understanding firms, the rationale for their existence, and their 
boundaries. We have speculated that by looking in some detail at how firms actually 
organise their high-level problem-solving activities, interesting links can be built between 
research on modularity and incomplete contracts theory. In so doing, it is possible to 
address issues related to how firms design ‘governance contracts’ (Holmström and 
Roberts, 1998) that put them at the centre of dense networks of relationships. We think it 
might be useful to link the notion of governance contract to that of ‘project’, and that 
insights can be gained by looking at the recent innovation and project management 
literature that focuses on ‘project-based firms’. In this way, we think that it is possible to 
address issues relating to: 
•  the ‘shape’ of these networks (e.g. modular, tightly coupled or loosely coupled) 
•  what roles different firms play in these networks (e.g. specialized suppliers vs. 
systems integrators) 
•  what functions are played by these networks (e.g. provide heterogeneous 
communities with a temporary common identity) 
•  how residual rights of control are allocated when contracts are incomplete. 
 
Paying attention to the distinction between knowledge and product dynamics is also useful 
to make sense of recent changes in the international division of labour. We may speculate 
that increasing international outsourcing of manufacturing and design facilities toward low 
cost countries reflects a major shift in the opportunities for major technical changes from 
the processing of materials into products, towards the processing of information into 
services.  As a consequence, we argue that the locus of competition through innovation in 
leading companies could shift from discrete physical product and process innovations 
associated with manufacturing, to innovations in the design, development, integration and 
marketing of increasingly complex products and systems. 
 
As foreseen by Drucker (2001)
6, this could lead to an increased – but still incomplete - 
disintegration between systems integration firms and manufacturing firms.  It could also 
re-inforce the shift of manufacturing towards certain lower-wage countries.  However, the 
high-skilled ‘services’ in which the high-wage countries specialize would not be 
                                                 
6 See his contrasting visions of the futures of GM and Toyota (pp. 18-19)   21 
‘‘immaterial’’ in the conventional sense.  They would comprise high-tech machines 
(processing information rather than materials), mastery of the knowledge underlying 
manufacturing, and a capacity for designing, integrating and supporting complex physical 
systems, including simulations and modelling products and processes, production and 
logistic operations, monitoring and control, and customer support: in other words, the 
skilled activities that manufacturing firms undertake, except manufacturing itself.  The 
fact that most of these activities are defined as ‘‘services’’ often confuses rather than 
clarifies. 
 
In this sense, firms specializing in systems design and integration are not post-industrial.  
They are instead the prolongation of the industrial system into a period of growing 
specialization and complexity, and of growing capacities to store, transmit and manipulate 
information.  High wage countries may indeed find themselves specializing increasingly 
on ‘‘services’’, not as an alternative to manufacturing activities but as the skill-intensive 
components within them.  The Visible Hand of manufacturing will not become invisible 
(Langlois, 2001), but continue to exploit economies of physical scale, speed and scope.  
At the same time, the Visible Brain of systems integration could become the dominant 
form of business organization in the world’s advanced countries.  22 
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Figure 1. 
Organizational coupling and different modes of co-ordination in four industries. 
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Figure 2. 










































Source: adapted from IPA Inc. Database. These indicators are computed on a sample of more than 
3000 projects executed worldwide, between 1985 and 1997. Data are normalized by project size 
and degree of technological novelty.    25 
Figure 3. 
Scheme of tasks for analysis and synthesis  
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Figure 4. 
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